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Furthermore, we should not forget that enforcement in developing 
countries is strongly linked with developed countries’ compliance with 
their obligations to assist in capacity building. (Siri Bjerke, Minister 
of Environment Norway, 9 February 2001).   
1. OBJECTIVE 
 
This report aspires to examine the role of provisions for technology and financial 
transfer as well as capacity building as an alternative to trade measures in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) to improve compliance and enforcement in 
developing countries.1  
Compliance and enforcement defined… 
In accordance with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) compliance is 
defined here as the fulfilment of a party’s obligations under a MEA (UNEP 2001a), 
whereas enforcement refers to ‘the full range of procedures and actions available to 
States to promote national compliance with domestic law, to deter non-compliance, and 
to address instances of non-compliance’ (UNEP 2001b).  
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
Pacta sunt servanda: 
Compliance and enforcement is required… 
Why be concerned about compliance and enforcement? One could argue that the best 
rules contained in MEAs are not worth the paper they are written on if the same rules 
are not complied with and enforced by the member countries to the MEAs. From a legal 
point of view, in general all countries, which have signed and ratified a MEA, have the 
duty to comply with and enforce the rules of the MEA according to the principle pacta 
sunt servanda. But in practice there is widespread non-compliance and non-enforcement 
with respect to many MEAs. Later on we will see, however, that not all forms of non-
compliance and non-enforcement are necessarily unexpected or undesired. Whilst there 
is reason to be concerned about non-compliance and non-enforcement, their presence is 
not bad in all instances.  
Non-compliance and 
non-enforcement are not easily detected… 
It is clear from the definitions given above that whether or not a country complies with 
and enforces the rules of a MEA is subject to interpretation and can be a contentious 
issue. This is the more so given that often treaty language is vague and ambiguous on 
important aspects. It is also clear that countries might comply with and enforce some 
rules of a given MEA, but might fail to do so with respect to other rules.  
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Compliance and enforcement 
with environmental MEAs are difficult to achieve… 
It is important to note that compliance with and enforcement of MEAs is often more 
difficult to achieve than is the case for some other international treaties. This is because, 
contrary to for example arms control or human rights treaties, MEA rules require 
governments to alter the behaviours and actions by private agents rather than by 
governmental authorities (Mitchell 1996, p. 17). In this they are similar to, for example, 
the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Impacts of Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), 
which also needs to exert control over private agents in order to perform effectively.  
Rules should be designed to facilitate verification… 
MEA rules should in principle be designed such that compliance and enforcement is 
facilitated and is easily verifiable. Mitchell (1996, p. 23) provides a good example for 
this: ‘In switching from limiting intentional oil discharges to requiring oil tankers to 
install expensive pollution-prevention equipment, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships elicited compliance from tanker owners with strong 
economic incentives not to comply because non-compliance would have required the 
cooperation of a ship-builder, a classification society, and an insurance company in 
constructing what all knew to be an illegal tanker’.  
Efforts exist to improve 
compliance and enforcement in MEAs… 
There have already been many efforts to improve compliance and enforcement in MEAs 
during the 1990s. As Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998, p. 513) suggest ‘there was 
6 
greater attention over time to implementation and compliance and to strengthening the 
supervisory mechanisms. The treaty budgets increased, secretariats generally grew 
modestly in size, and more attention was paid to monitoring and compliance. The 
functioning of the Montreal Protocol’s Implementation Committee and the adoption of 
the noncompliance procedures are strong examples of this trend’.  
But compliance and 
enforcement issues have been neglected… 
These efforts notwithstanding, there is a widespread impression that compliance and 
enforcement have been somewhat neglected in the sometimes hectic process of drafting, 
negotiating and concluding MEAs that cover ever more aspects of the environment ever 
more comprehensively. For example, UNEP (2000) states that compliance with and 
enforcement of MEAs ‘does not as yet match the speed at which they were developed’. 
Consequently, there seems to be a consensus that more attention needs to be given to 
compliance and enforcement. For example, UNEP (2001a) postulates ‘an urgent need to 
strengthen compliance by parties with multilateral environmental agreements’. The so-
called Malmö Ministerial Declaration of Environment Ministers declares an “alarming 
discrepancy between commitment and action” (Bjerke 2001).  
Not all forms of non-compliance 
or non-enforcement are strictly undesirable… 
This could create the impression as if strict compliance with and enforcement of all 
rules of a given MEA is what should be aspired for. Such a conclusion neglects the fact, 
however, that often rules are set above a level that many of a MEA’s parties can comply 
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with immediately or within the foreseeable future. These high standards often perform 
the function of setting targets to which parties are supposed to move towards over time. 
This observation is not just valid for MEAs, but also applies to other international 
regimes. As Levy, Keohane and Haas (1993, p. 404) observe, regime standards are often 
set higher than many countries with weak administrative capacity can comply with. This 
is because high regime standards serve other functions as well, such as generating 
political concern in ‘weak countries’ and setting normative goals for them, 
communicating the intensity of preferences among regime members and legitimating 
technical aid or outright transfer payments that might otherwise be denounced as bribes 
or blackmail. Similarly, unqualified focus on compliance issues could result in a call for 
the avoidance of all vague and ambiguous treaty language. Doing so would neglect the 
fact, however, that often vague and ambiguous treaty language, which might lead to 
disputes over whether or not a country is in compliance, is at the same time necessary to 
make a successful negotiation of a MEA possible in the first instance.  
Furthermore, Mitchell (1996, p. 25) points out that compliance is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of a MEA: ‘Non-compliance with an 
ambitious goal may still produce considerable positive behavioural change that may 
significantly mitigate, if not solve, an environmental problem’, whilst ‘high compliance 
levels with rules that merely codify existing behaviour, or rules that reflect political 
rather than scientific realities, will prove inadequate to achieve the hoped-for 
environmental improvement.’ One needs to warn therefore against too much and 
unqualified concern about compliance and enforcement. They are important issues, but 
they cannot be the only ones guiding policy makers. 
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Non-enforcement and non- 
compliance exist at the domestic level as well… 
It is also important to notice that problems with compliance and enforcement are by far 
not exclusive to either rules contained in MEAs or developing countries. Jacobson and 
Brown Weiss (1998, p. 512) come to the conclusion that ‘viewed against the assessment 
of compliance with national laws and regulations within the United States and with 
Community regulations and directives within the European Union (…) the record at the 
international level is comparable or better’.  
Nevertheless, non-compliance and 
non-enforcement can represent a problem for MEAs… 
Nevertheless, substantial and unwanted non-compliance with and non-enforcement of 
MEA rules can lead to activities that are contrary to the rules laid down in MEAs and 
can cause great harm. UNEP (1999) goes as far as calling them ‘international 
environmental criminal activities’ and estimates that the total value of these activities 
are in the order of $20-40 billion annually, or around 5-10% of the size of the global 
illegal drugs trade. Box 1 lists areas covered by MEAs where illegal activities occur as a 
consequence of non-compliance and non-enforcement of MEA rules.  
Box 1: Prominent examples of illegal activities as a consequence of non-compliance 
and non-enforcement of MEA rules 
 
• Illegal trade in endangered species and their products (evasion of CITES). 
• Illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances (evasion of Montreal Protocol). 
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• Illegal movements of hazardous waste (evasion of Basel Convention). 
• Illegal whaling (in breach of IWC regulations). 
• Illegal fishing (outside quota, or in breach of various regional fisheries agreements). 
• Illegal logging and trade in timber. 
• Illegal dumping of oil at sea (evasion of Marpol Convention). 
 
It is important to note that this list is not exhaustive and just encompasses the best 
known examples of activities that breach rules of MEAs. 
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3. APPROACHES TO STRENGTHEN 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN MEAS 
 
Three approaches to strengthen compliance 
and enforcement: sunshine, carrots and sticks… 
There are basically three approaches through which compliance and enforcement can 
become strengthened. The first one is comprised of what Jacobson and Brown Weiss 
(1998) call “sunshine methods”: improved monitoring, reporting, on-site inspections 
and access to information. The second is to use what is known as “sticks” or negative 
measures: penalties, mostly in the form of trade measures, against those who fail to 
comply and enforce. Trade measures are defined here as ‘any policy instrument which 
attaches requirements, conditions or restrictions on imported or exported products or 
services themselves, or the process of their importation or exportation’ (OECD 1999, p. 
11). The third is known as “carrots” or positive measures: financial or other incentives 
to assist countries in building the administrative capacity for compliance and 
enforcement.  
Sunshine is best regarded 
as complementary to the carrots approach… 
It is clear that sunshine methods can only provide a very indirect way of strengthening 
compliance and enforcement. The basic underlying presumption of this approach is that 
countries pay a lot of attention to their compliance and enforcement reputation and if 
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only more becomes widely and publicly known about their non-compliance and non-
enforcement they will engage in remedial action. However, it is unclear whether the 
effects of strengthened sunshine methods on the reputation of countries alone would be 
strong enough to improve substantially compliance and enforcement. Furthermore, in as 
much as some of the sunshine methods such as improved monitoring and reporting are 
hampered by managerial incapacity and financial constraints this strategy will be 
regarded as complementary to the carrots approach in this report.  
Developing countries oppose the 
sticks approach and favour the carrots approach… 
Whilst there is very little systematic evidence for this, there is a widespread belief and 
some more qualitative evidence (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998) that developing 
countries have more problems with compliance and enforcement with MEAs than 
developed countries.2 Developing countries are therefore concerned about the use of 
sticks. They fear that trade measures will be used (and often abused) to their detriment. 
As Mitchell (1996, p. 15) states: ‘Powerful states, and they alone, use sanctions to 
enforce those international rules that suit their immediate interests’. Developing 
countries welcome carrots on the other hand since they are likely to benefit from 
financial and other incentives.  
This seems to suggest that whether sticks or carrots are used does not really matter from 
the perspective of compliance and enforcement and that the two approaches merely 
differ in their distributional impacts, in particular in their effect on developing countries. 
Such a conclusion would be wrong, however. This is because, as this report will argue, 
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the lack of compliance and enforcement in many countries, particularly the developing 
ones, is not caused by a lack of will to comply and enforce. Rather it is caused by a lack 
of administrative, financial and technical capacity. The use of sticks will therefore only 
have the effect of punishing the recipient country, but will, in most cases, not improve 
either compliance or enforcement. Only financial and technological transfer as well as 
assistance in capacity building can bring about better compliance and enforcement. In 
other words, this report will argue that more emphasis should be put on carrots and less 
on sticks in the design of MEAs.3  
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4. THE STICKS APPROACH (NEGATIVE MEASURES) 
 
Defenders of the sticks approach regard trade measures as effective, politically realistic 
and ‘relatively acceptable’ (Jenkins 1996, p. 127) means of bringing deviant parties into 
compliance and enforcement (Charnovitz 1994). The more sophisticated defenders of 
the sticks approach realise that unilaterally imposed trade measures raise serious 
sovereignty and international political economy issues and are therefore more in favour 
of a multilateral decision-making process allowing or even requiring the imposition of 
trade measures (Jenkins 1996, p. 226).  
Trade measures fulfil three functions in MEAs… 
To understand the appeal that the sticks approach has to many, it is very important to 
understand the role trade measures can fulfil in MEAs. There are basically three 
functions: First, they can be used to deter internal and external free-riding; second, they 
can mitigate problems with so-called emission leakage; and finally, they can be used to 
directly further the objectives of a MEA in restricting trade in specified substances or 
species. We will look at each of these three functions one after the other.  
Internal and external free-riding… 
Economists have examined the strategic incentives countries face with respect to 
internal and external free-riding in MEAs and have developed the concepts of self-
enforcing and renegotiation-proof agreements.4 What does this mean? Many 
environmental problems are truly international or global. They cannot be tackled by a 
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single country alone. Hence international cooperation is needed for a solution. But 
whereas environmental policy can use the enforcing power that sovereign nation-states 
ideally have within their territory, in general international environmental policy cannot 
take recourse to a supra-national authority with enforcing powers. The affected 
countries are confronted with a basic Prisoner’s Dilemma, in the following sense: the 
countries have an interest in, say, reducing emissions or reducing over-harvesting of an 
exhaustible natural resource and all countries would be better off with international 
environmental cooperation, but each and every one of them also has an incentive to 
free-ride on the others’ efforts and to enjoy the benefits of abatement or harvest 
limitations without incurring any costs of emission or harvest reduction. (In the 
following I will speak of emissions only for expositional ease, but the argument applies 
to any form of environmental degradation.)  
Therefore MEAs normally have to deter external free-riding, that is, they have to deter 
countries that would benefit from emission reduction from not signing up to the 
agreement and staying outside. Equally, they have to deter internal free-riding, that is, 
they have to deter signatory countries from not complying with the requirements of the 
agreement. What is important is that the mechanism employed to achieve deterrence has 
to be self-enforcing in the sense that a recourse to an external enforcement agency is not 
feasible: No country can be forced to sign an agreement and signatories cannot be 
forced to comply with the agreement.  
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Problems with deterring 
free-riding in the absence of trade measures… 
One of the mechanisms that could potentially achieve such deterrence are trade 
measures. Before coming to this point, let us first examine, however, what the problems 
are if trade measures (or a similar mechanism) were unavailable. Then the only variable 
left to a country is the amount of pollution it emits. Hence, the only mechanism left is to 
threaten not to undertake any emission reduction in order to deter external free-riding or 
to decrease emissions by less than required by the agreement in order to punish non-
compliant countries and to deter internal free-riding. This threat has to be credible in the 
sense that it is in the interest of the threatening country (or countries) to actually execute 
the threat whenever other countries try to free-ride. In other words, a threat cannot be 
credible if a country is worse off after executing the threat than it would be without 
execution. Non-credible threats cannot deter because potential free riders will anticipate 
that they could get away with free-riding without being punished. Moreover, an 
agreement which establishes such a mechanism to deter free-riding has to be 
renegotiation-proof. This means that the threat has to be credible also in the sense that 
the threatening country (or countries) must be better off actually executing the threat 
than refraining from execution and renegotiating a new agreement with the free-riding 
country (or countries). Agreements that are not renegotiation-proof cannot deter because 
potential free riders will anticipate that they could strike another deal after free-riding 
and could therefore get away without being punished.  
What are the consequences of the requirements of self-enforcement and renegotiation-
proofness on international environmental cooperation. If trade measures (or a similar 
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mechanism) are unavailable, then one basic result holds: a self-enforcing and 
renegotiation-proof agreement will either consist of only a small subset of affected 
countries or if many countries are parties to the agreement then the gains from 
cooperation relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium are very small. In other words, 
large-scale cooperation will either not take place as only few countries sign the 
agreement or if it does take place it is virtually irrelevant as the agreed upon cooperation 
improves only marginally on what would have been achieved by unilateral action in the 
absence of the agreement. Cooperation is either narrow (instead of wide) or shallow 
(instead of deep).  
This result leads us to pessimistic expectations about a solution to an environmental 
problem exactly for those problems, for which international cooperation is most needed. 
To see this, note that for the case where the benefits from emission abatement are high 
and the costs are low (for example, ozone depleting substances), the basic result that 
cooperation will either be narrow or, if wide, will not be deep, does not matter much as 
countries have big incentives to solve the problem unilaterally. The same might even be 
true if the benefits from abatement are relatively low as long as the costs are low as 
well. Similarly, for the case where the benefits from abatement are low and the costs are 
high, the basic result from the economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation does not matter much as even the full cooperative outcome would not do 
much about the environmental problem due to high costs. The case where the basic 
result is really relevant is the one where benefits from abatement are high, but so are 
costs (for example, greenhouse gas emissions). These are exactly the cases where a 
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solution to the environmental problem would demand wide and deep cooperation most 
(Barrett 1991, pp. 14f.).  
What is the intuitive reason for this rather pessimistic result? In order to deter free-
riding, an agreement must specify that the non free-riding countries increase their 
emissions relative to an agreement without free-riding in order to punish free-riders for 
not decreasing their emissions at all (external free-riding) or by not as much as 
requested by the agreement (internal free-riding). In order to deter, the damage to the 
potential free-rider caused by the increase in emissions must be greater than the 
potential benefit from free-riding. The wider and deeper cooperation is, the higher is the 
benefit from free-riding so that the damage to the potential free-rider must also increase 
in order to deter free-riding. The problem is, however, that the bigger is the damage to 
the potential free-rider, the bigger is the damage to the punishing countries themselves 
as well. This self-inflicted damage due to the emission increase limits the punishment 
that is available for free-rider deterrence. It must not hurt the punishing countries more 
than the damage caused by the free-riding. Otherwise it will not be credible as the 
potential free-rider knows that it is not in the best interest of the punishing countries to 
execute the punishment.  
What is more, there must not exist any incentive for the punishing countries and the 
free-riders to renegotiate the agreement and strike another deal. For this condition to 
hold, the punishment must not be very high or else the damage to the free-riding 
country is big as is its incentive to renegotiate another agreement. Because of these twin 
reasons the credible punishment available cannot be very substantial which means that 
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it cannot deter much free-riding. Because external free-riding can be deterred only to a 
small extent, free-riding is ubiquitous and the number of countries participating in an 
agreement is small. Alternatively, because internal free-riding can be deterred only to a 
small extent, then the agreement cannot improve much relative to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium in order to keep the incentives for non-compliance small, if the number of 
signatories is large.  
Trade measures can deter free-riding… 
Let us address the question now how trade measures might overcome the negative 
effects of the requirements of self-enforcement and renegotiation-proofness on 
international environmental cooperation. Barrett (1997) shows how linking an 
international environmental agreement with trade can promote cooperation. Trade 
measures are a more credible threat to deter free-riding than an increase in emissions 
because, according to Barrett, trade measures mainly harm the free-rider, whereas the 
emission increase considerably harms the punisher as well.5 Hence, with trade measures 
free-riding can be deterred more effectively as a more substantial punishment becomes 
credible, so wider and deeper cooperation can be achieved as a self-enforcing and 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium.  
as well as leakage… 
Another problem, which can be addressed by restrictive trade measures is so-called 
leakage. Leakage describes the phenomenon that a decrease in emissions by the 
participants to an agreement is counter-acted by an increase of emissions by non-
members. Lastly, in some MEAs, restrictions of trade in specified substances or species 
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is the very objective of the MEA, rather than an instrument to deter free-riding.  This is 
the case, for example, in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) as well as the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.  
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5. THE CARROTS APPROACH (POSITIVE MEASURES) 
 
Defenders of the carrots approach also believe that their preferred means of bringing 
countries into compliance and enforcement, namely the provision of assistance, is the 
more effective one (Gündling 1996). They argue that by far the most important reason 
for failure of compliance or enforcement is a lack of awareness, education, training and 
capacity, particularly in developing countries. A good example for this is the CITES, for 
which a 1993 study found that ‘less than 20% of the Contracting Parties to that 
Convention had as yet finalized appropriate implementation legislation. This was seen 
to be due to both a lack of awareness of international requirements and to a paucity of 
personnel trained in the field of environmental law’ (Navid 1996, p. 817).  
The following paragraphs will describe how an ideal version of the carrots approach 
would look like for MEAs:  
The carrots approach in an ideal MEA… 
To start with, it is important to note that assistance, particularly with respect to the least 
developed countries, must start long before a MEA comes into effect. Many countries 
do not have the necessary financial and administrative resources to participate at all or 
effectively in the negotiation of MEAs. Special financial funds and training schemes 
should therefore be made available to these countries. As these funds need to be 
independent of the specific MEA under negotiation it would be best to allocate such a 
fund to a UN agency, preferably UNEP. 
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Initial compliance report… 
Upon becoming a member to a MEA every country should state in a report to what 
extent it is already in compliance with the rules of the MEA. This report must also set 
out a strategy of steps to be undertaken to bring the country into full compliance. It must 
indicate which national authorities are responsible for which steps of the strategy and 
the country needs to name an authority with overall compliance responsibility. Indeed, 
for every MEA information should be available as to the relevant point of contact 
within a country for issues arising with respect to compliance and enforcement. This 
information should be centrally stored and managed, preferably with UNEP.  
Assistance for a compliance strategy… 
Special funds should be made available by each MEA to assist developing countries in 
putting the strategy for compliance into practice. Such assistance should encompass 
amongst other things: Administrative and technical assistance to draft effective laws and 
regulations, educational, financial and other assistance to hire and train staff for the 
development, implementation and monitoring of the compliance strategy.  
Reporting requirements… 
In exchange for extensive assistance facilities, parties to an MEA should in turn have 
the obligation to submit timely reports on the state of their compliance and enforcement. 
As these reports commit scarce management capacity, they should focus on the most 
important aspects and follow a standard format whose very core should be transferable 
from one MEA to another. Small developing countries who are likely to be 
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overburdened by extensive reporting requirements for various MEAs should receive 
comprehensive assistance. The secretariat of an MEA should collect the information and 
provide the conference of parties as well as the public with an informative review of the 
results of the reports. It should provide a review of the state of compliance in member 
countries, similar to the trade policy review undertaken within the auspices of the WTO. 
It goes without saying that in order to perform these functions the secretariat must be 
well staffed. Reporting requirements are most effective if they lead to increased 
awareness within member countries about the obligations under the MEA rules and if 
they function as an educational and training tool for those required to prepare the 
reports. Secretariats should help parties to identify cases of non-compliance and non-
enforcement and should advise and assist parties on how to comply with the pertinent 
MEA rules.  
Engaging the private sector… 
The secretariat should welcome inputs from third parties such as NGOs, businesses and 
private individuals on the state of compliance in member countries. NGOs, in particular, 
can be helpful in information dissemination and awareness raising among the wider 
public. Engaging the private sector and the wider public can lead to the establishing or 
strengthening of a culture of compliance and enforcement. In case of doubt or for 
general sporadic verification of the information provided by parties, on site monitoring 
as well as adequate surveillance and investigative methods such as interviewing of 
relevant country staff should be allowed.  
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How to deal with 
non-compliance and non-enforcement… 
As is already common practice in MEAs, the formal decision that a member country is 
in non-compliance with the MEA rules should not be undertaken by the secretariat to 
the MEA, but should be left to the conference of the parties based upon information 
provided by the secretariat supplemented by the input from on-site monitoring and third 
parties as mentioned above. If a country is in non-compliance, it should be given a 
warning that it needs to develop a strategy to achieve compliance within a reasonable 
period of time. This warning should be accompanied with a comprehensive package of 
assistance to help the non-complying party achieve compliance. Efforts to achieve 
compliance need to be regularly monitored. Only if the non-complying party acts in bad 
faith and exhibits unwillingness to comply even in the presence of assistance should it 
be punished with sanctions such as public announcement (“name and shame”), the 
deprivation of voting rights and other membership benefits, and, as a means of last 
resort, trade measures. Again, only the conference of parties, not the secretariat, should 
have the competence to decide on these measures.  
Assistance should be provided multilaterally… 
Preferably and contrary to existing practice, assistance should not be provided 
bilaterally as this leaves much discretion to the donating country. Instead, assistance 
should be administered centrally through a special committee of the MEA and the level 
of assistance and the criteria of their allocation should be laid down in the rules 
governing the MEA. Such committees should have regional subsidiaries, where 
appropriate, to facilitate decentralised provision of technical, financial, educational and 
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other capacity building assistance, including regional information clearing houses.6 
Where there is overlap between assistance programmes, efforts should be bundled 
together into joint programmes. Importantly, as some of the capacity building is 
inevitably very general in nature and is not specific to any particular MEA such as the 
capacity to formulate environmental law and regulations and to train and educate 
relevant staff, there should be a general fund available, preferably under the auspices of 
UNEP, that provides general assistance to developing countries in environmental 
matters.  
Technology transfer needs to be facilitated… 
To facilitate technology transfer, the provision of information, knowledge and skills to 
firms on how to acquire and use technology is important. However, as a further step a 
collective technology rights bank for specific MEAs can be established. Such a bank 
can help in transferring technology via ‘(a) negotiating the acquisition and diffusion of 
patent rights with technology owners on fair terms; (b) accepting patents as donations 
from both private and public sectors; and (c) initiating licenses, commercial 
development agreements and use agreements with suitable users in developing countries 
under conditions negotiated on a case-by-case basis’ (UNCTAD 1997, p. 7).  
Dispute settlement as a measure of last resort… 
Dispute settlement procedures need to be in place in case of conflict between parties 
about whether or not a certain party is guilty of wilful non-compliance and non-
enforcement. Dispute settlement should be understood very broadly here, referring to 
the full range available from mediation and conciliation to formal judiciary settlement 
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only as a matter of last resort. As a matter of routine, all MEAs should provide last 
recourse to dispute settlement by the International Court of Justice, which in July 1993 
established a seven member Chamber for Environmental Matters (Sand 1996, p. 75).7  
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6. STICKS OR CARROTS? 
 
We have seen in the chapter on the sticks approach that trade measures can fulfil three 
functions within MEAs:  
1. To deter external free-riding and encourage countries to join the MEA. 
2. To deter countries from non-compliance with or non-enforcement of the rules of the 
MEA (sometimes called internal free-riding). 
3. To prevent erosion of the MEA by preventing leakage.  
In the following we will merely address trade measures that are imposed for the second 
function. There are two reasons for this: The first and main reason is that this report 
focuses on issues of compliance and enforcement. The second reason is that developing 
countries are much less concerned with and often supportive of the use of trade 
measures employed for the other two functions. Especially with respect to MEAs that 
are perceived as equitable in their burden sharing and of truly global interest, 
developing countries as well want to see external free-riding deterred and leakage 
prevented and will not necessarily object to the employment of trade measures. What 
they object to is the employment of trade measures for the second function, since they 
anticipate that they will be the target of such measures and unjustly so since they 
believe that non-compliance and non-enforcement is a consequence of lacking capacity 
rather than wilful violations of MEA rules.  
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Trade measures do not work well 
in deterring non-compliance and non-enforcement… 
This perception of developing country representatives is strongly buttressed
 
by the 
available empirical evidence. Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (1998), based on an earlier 
and more detailed enquiry into compliance with treaties in international regulatory 
regimes, come to the conclusion that it is highly erroneous to believe that most 
compliance problems are caused by wilful violations. They argue in favour of a view of 
‘noncompliance as expected rather than deviant, and as inherent rather than deliberate. 
This in turn leads to deemphasis on enforcement measures or coercive sanctions, 
whether formal or informal, except in the most egregious cases. It shifts attention to 
sources of noncompliance that routine international political processes can manage. 
Thus, improved dispute-resolution procedures address problems of ambiguity; technical 
and financial assistance can mitigate, if not eliminate, capacity problems; and 
transparency and review processes increase the likelihood that national policies are 
brought progressively into line with agreed international standards’ (Chayes, Chayes 
and Mitchell 1998, p. 62).  
A joint paper by the Secretariats of UNEP and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
argues that ‘it is recognized that in most cases, when a State is in non-compliance, this 
is not because of a wilful violation, but rather because of a lack of ability to comply. 
Therefore, the best way to address non-compliance is through the provision of 
assistance, rather than through punitive measures. This is particularly true when 
addressing compliance issues related to developing countries.’ (WTO and UNEP 2001, 
p. 2). 
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Kummer (1994, p. 262) also believes that the carrots approach is inherently politically 
more realistic in MEA negotiations: ‘Due to the absence of punitive elements, measures 
providing incentives generally stand a higher chance of political acceptance than those 
providing for sanctions or reprisals. (…) [I]nternational treaty negotiations are rarely 
hampered by controversies over the necessity of technical and financial assistance, and 
the aim of supporting developing countries in the fulfilment of their obligations, even 
though the modalities can be controversial’.  
The compatibility of the 
sticks approach with WTO rules is questionable… 
A further, at least potential, problem with the sticks approach lies in the fact that the 
application of trade measures might violate the rights of countries that are members of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is beyond the present paper to discuss this 
issue in detail  – see Neumayer (2000, 2001b) for a comprehensive discussion. Box 1 
provides a brief overview of the relevant aspects and demonstrates that there is 
substantial reason to presume that trade measures taken in pursuance of MEA objectives 
could clash with the rights and obligations of WTO member countries. Incompatibility 
with WTO rules can render the sticks approach potentially ineffective, which would 
further buttress the case for using the carrots approach instead. Note that this would 
apply to all three uses of trade measures mentioned further above.  
The compatibility of trade measures taken in pursuance of MEAs with WTO rules has 
gained fresh importance with the initiation of negotiations aimed at clarifying the 
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relationship at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001. At this 
moment, it is unclear what the outcome of these negotiations will be. However, the 
formulation used in the Ministerial Declaration seems to suggest that whatever the 
outcome might be, WTO members will retain the right to challenge trade measures 
before a dispute panel (negotiations ‘shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member 
that is not a party to the MEA in question’ and ‘shall not add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations of Members under existing WTO Agreements’).  
Box 2: The compatibility of trade measures in MEAs with WTO rules. 
 
No WTO member has ever challenged any trade measure another WTO member had 
purportedly undertaken in compliance with an MEA. Hence no relevant WTO case law 
and no binding interpretation exists – as of yet. Nevertheless one can examine whether 
trade provisions in MEAs appear to clash with WTO rules. The answer is that this can 
indeed be the case. 
Most MEAs with explicitly mandated or allowed for trade measures restrict trade 
between parties and non-parties or even trade between parties. These restrictions 
certainly violate the general most favoured nation treatment obligation in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article I. If these restrictions take the form of 
import or export bans, export certificates or access restrictions rather than duties, taxes 
or other charges then they might violate the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions obligation in GATT Article XI. If countries in alleged pursuance to or 
compliance with MEAs applied regulations or taxes differently to imported than to 
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domestically produced goods and services, then they might also violate their national 
treatment obligation contained in GATT Article III. If they applied product standards or 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures that affected domestic and foreign producers 
differently they might violate their obligations under the Technical Barries to Trade 
(TBT) Agreement or under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement). However, the trade provisions contained in MEAs, which appear to 
violate one or the other GATT obligations, can still be considered WTO consistent if 
they are covered by the general exceptions of GATT Article XX or similar provisions in 
one of the other WTO agreements. We will concentrate on GATT Article XX, which 
reads as follows: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
... 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; 
In the following we will look at the MEAs covered in some detail in this paper, namely 
the Montreal Protocol, CITES and the Basel Convention and briefly discuss whether 
trade measures taken in pursuance of these agreements could be justified with recourse 
to GATT Article XX. 
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The ozone layer as well as endangered species constitute an exhaustible natural resource 
in the meaning of Art. XX(g). The article further demands that trade measures ‘are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’, 
which is true for the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention. However, problems 
could arise with respect to CITES as its provisions for the regulation of domestic 
wildlife use contrary to its provisions for the regulation of international wildlife trade 
are rather rudimentary. Trade measures must also ‘relate to’ the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource, which has been interpreted by GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement as ‘primarily aimed at’ such conservation. All three MEAs should pass this 
test as their very aim is the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. However, a 
problem could arise if a WTO panel interprets the objective of trade measures, 
especially in the Montreal Protocol, narrowly as merely broadening the participation of 
countries in deterring free-riding, rather than directly protecting an exhaustible resource. 
Could these trade measures then still be considered ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation? 
 
All three MEAs furthermore purport to protect either human, animal or plant life or 
health in the meaning of Article XX(b). The article requires further that trade measures 
are ‘necessary’ for such protection, which has been interpreted by GATT/WTO dispute 
panel as requiring that ‘no alternative measures either consistent or less inconsistent’ 
with WTO rules exist. This requirement could potentially pose an insurmountable 
hurdle for all three MEAs. Could taxes or transferable emission permits have phased out 
ODS as effectively and rapidly as the trade restrictions contained in the Montreal 
Protocol? Could direct harvest and wildlife management regulations prevent extinction 
of endangered species similarly to the trade restrictions contained in CITES? Are trade 
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restrictions really necessary to prevent environmental and health damage from 
transborder shipments of hazardous waste? Even accepting the validity of ‘limited 
capabilities of the developing countries to manage hazardous wastes and other wastes’ 
(preamble of Basel Convention), is a complete ban of trade in hazardous waste between 
OECD- and non-OECD countries really necessary? Are there really no less GATT 
inconsistent measures for the preservation of biodiversity than restrictions on access to 
genetic resources? Would less GATT inconsistent measures need to be equally effective 
as the trade restrictions to be considered alternatives? It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to attempt to answer these questions. Suffice it to say here that it is open to 
debate at least whether the trade measures contained in the three MEAs could pass the 
‘necessity’ test of Art. XX(b). 
 
If trade measures in MEAs are covered by one of the exceptions in Art. XX(b) or 
XX(g), they must still pass the requirements as set by the preamble of the article. This 
seems to be rather easy with respect to the requirement that these measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute ‘a disguised restriction on international 
trade’, as the three MEAs are explicit and rather transparent in their provision for trade 
restrictions. It is more doubtful, but still arguable, that they are ‘not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail’. This clause is usually interpreted by 
GATT/WTO panels as the requirement to carefully balance the environmental 
objectives of the trade measures with the trade rights of negatively affected WTO 
members. As all three MEAs have very widespread multilateral support one can argue 
that the international community of nation states has given its blessing to the objectives 
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contained in the MEAs and to the trade measures they employ. Furthermore, the 
Montreal Protocol, CITES and the Basel Convention do not discriminate against non-
parties as such as these can still enjoy all the trade benefits of parties if, in spite of 
remaining non-parties, they comply with the substantial obligations of the agreement. 
From this perspective, one could argue that the trade measures in all three MEAs would 
stand a good chance to pass the preambular test of Art. XX. 
 
So far we have focussed on trade measures between parties and either non-parties or 
non-complying parties as specifically mandated or explicitly allowed by the MEAs. We 
have seen that while the potential for WTO inconsistency clearly exists, it is far from 
clear that these measures actually are WTO inconsistent. Things are different with 
respect to measures a MEA party might undertake without specific mandate or 
permission contained in a MEA. Such a country could still argue that while these 
measures are not specifically mandated or allowed for by a MEA they are nevertheless 
undertaken in pursuance and compliance of mandated MEA obligations. Whether these 
would pass scrutiny for WTO consistency is much less clear and cannot be answered in 
general as the answer very much depends on the concrete measure undertaken and the 
manner in which it was applied. 
That countries like to invoke MEAs in justification for at times clearly protectionist 
measures can be seen by two cases: ‘United States – Prohibition of imports of tuna and 
tuna products from Canada’, justified, inter alia, as furthering the objectives of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission and the International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (GATT 1983); and ‘Canada – Measures affecting 
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exports of unprocessed herring and salmon’, whereby Canada in its submissions 
referred to international agreements on fisheries and the Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (GATT 1987). 
 
The carrots approach has 
some problems as well, however… 
Whilst the arguments presented so far make a strong case for the use of the carrots 
approach, it is also not without problems. Kummer, for example, neglects the fact that 
provisions for substantial assistance that go beyond mere rhetoric or minimalist 
financial commitments are very rare in international treaty making in general as well as 
with respect to the environment. As Mitchell (1996, p. 14) points out ‘governments 
prove reluctant to pay not only their own compliance costs, but those of other 
governments who are obligated under the treaty to comply in any event’, noting that 
assistance faces the problem of raising the necessary funds, which poses a collective 
action problem within the group of donors.  
such as limited funds… 
In principle, there is no objective that the carrots approach could not achieve equally 
well as the sticks approach. But, as Charnovitz (1994, p. 7) points out ‘there is a 
practical limit to the use of carrots because they require the commitment of domestic 
resources. A carrot given away cannot be enjoyed at home’. Furthermore, defenders of 
the sticks approach argue that the carrots approach leads to moral hazard problems in 
that the countries potentially receiving the carrots have an incentive to overstate their 
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need for assistance: ‘The problem with carrots is that the appetite for them can be 
insatiable. If all countries knew that sticks are verboten, then obtaining and maintaining 
an agreement may require an increasing amount of carrots’ (Charnovitz 1994, p. 19), 
which might destabilize the MEA.  
“New and additional finance” is a vague promise… 
Another problem of the carrots approach is that the promise of ‘new and additional 
finance’ to meet all the ‘incremental costs’ by developing country parties that was the 
formulation used in the treaties of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro is a very vague one (Jordan and 
Werksman 1996). New and additional finance begs the question: in addition to what? In 
addition to existing levels of aid or the 0.7% of GNP benchmark set by the United 
Nations, but not adhered to by the vast majority of developed countries? In addition to 
total existing resource flows including private investment flows? Or simply in addition 
to existing environmental assistance flows? Not surprisingly, with such ambiguity built 
into the very terms, developed countries could on the whole get away without making 
specific substantial commitments, with the possible exceptions of the Montreal Protocol 
Multilateral Fund and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which together represent 
a rather limited financial commitment, however.  
And what are “incremental costs”?… 
Similarly vague and ambiguous is the term ‘incremental costs’. Certainly, the donors of 
assistance have an incentive to argue that few costs are incremental, whereas the 
recipient countries have the opposite incentive. Are ‘gross’ or ‘net’ incremental costs 
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relevant? Jordan and Werksman (1996, p. 253) define gross incremental costs as ‘the 
difference between the total costs of implementing a proposed project and that course of 
action which the developing country would have pursued had it not undertaken 
commitments under the Convention’. Net incremental costs, on the other hand, can be 
defined as ‘the additional cost of complying with the Convention minus the value of any 
domestic benefits thereby generated’. The gross incremental cost interpretation ensures 
that developing recipient countries are better off after receiving the finance, whereas the 
net incremental cost interpretation leaves them indifferent between the “no finance, no 
project” and the “finance and project” situation. It does not come as great surprise that 
the developing countries favour the gross incremental costs approach, whereas the 
developed countries as well as the institutions within their political control such as the 
GEF generally favour the net incremental approach.  
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7. THE CARROTS AND STICKS 
APPROACHES IN THE REALITY OF MEAS 
 
Some form of carrots 
are common practice in practically all MEAs… 
To some extent at least some form of carrots are common practice in almost all MEAs. 
As Kummer (1994, p. 259) observes: ‘Practically all modern environmental treaty 
systems provide for extensive obligations of mutual assistance in technical fields, 
cooperation in research, monitoring of the state of the environment, and elaboration of 
action plans, as well as exchange of information’. Sometimes the secretariats of MEAs 
are charged with providing assistance to the member countries. For example, the Basel 
Convention Secretariat provides assistance in identifying and dealing with cases of 
illegal traffic in hazardous wastes. CITES and UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme 
organise training seminars and help in the solution of technical problems. Some MEAs 
such as the Climate Convention, the Montreal Protocol and the Biodiversity Convention 
have even established specialised advisory bodies to help parties to establish, process 
and monitor relevant information flows (Kummer 1994, p. 260). In general, MEAs give 
preference to flexible, cooperative, consensus-building mechanisms instead of more 
formal methods of dispute settlement (WTO and UNEP 2001, p. 4).  
As concerns a comprehensive database of contact points for compliance and 
enforcement, efforts in this respect have already been undertaken and a preliminary 
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worldwide list has already been established (UNEP 2001c). However, it is still 
incomplete and needs to be extended and regularly updated.  
Some general assistance 
provisions are not confined to specific MEAs… 
In addition to such assistance facilities at the level of each individual MEA, there is also 
a number of more general activity ongoing under the auspices of UNEP. This agency 
provides technical assistance to countries ‘through the development of national laws and 
relevant institution-building mechanisms to implement specific agreements and related 
training programmes’ to build capacity in developing countries (UNEP 2000). 
Countries, which have received such assistance, include Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei 
Darussalam, Chad, Cuba, Ghana, Mauritania, Myanmar, the Niger, Nigeria, Oman and 
Peru. UNEP has also held a regional workshop on environmental compliance and 
enforcement in Bangkok, Thailand, and has planned more for other regions. UNEP has 
also facilitated and coordinated the development of a regional CITES enforcement 
treaty in Africa (the so-called Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement 
Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora). This treaty establishes 
bodies responsible for enforcement at three institutional levels: ‘a Task Force of 
seconded law enforcement officers from each Party capable of operating internationally 
against illegal trade in wild fauna and flora; a National Bureau designated by each Party 
to guide and receive information from the Task Force on illegal trade; and a decision-
making body called the Governing Council of the Parties which sets policy and reviews 
actions and to which the Task Force Director is accountable’ (UNEP 2000). UNEP is 
also assisting 27 countries in preparing their National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
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Plans and national reports to the conference  of parties of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (UNEP website).  
In comparison, trade measures 
play a relatively minor role in the majority of MEAs… 
In comparison and maybe somewhat surprisingly trade measures do not play any role in 
the vast majority of MEAs. A 1994 survey revealed that while many of the then 180 
international treaties and other agreements on environmental matters contained trade-
related aspects, only 18 actually employed trade measures (WTO 1994).  
But quite an important role in the major MEAs… 
However, in three of the most important MEAs, which we will look at now, trade 
measures play a prominent role alongside assistance provisions and those measures are 
bound to play a major role in future amendments to the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. Also, the number of MEAs containing trade measures has 
certainly increased since the WTO (1994) study was undertaken with the conclusion of 
such agreements as the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam 
Convention), the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Agreement). Box 3 provides some background 
information on the three MEAs under focus in this study.  
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Box 3: The three MEAs under focus in this study 
 
The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, concluded in 
September 1987, was the first major breakthrough in multilateral efforts trying to tackle 
the problem of thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer. It has 183 parties as of January 
2002. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, concluded in 
1985, had no binding obligations included. The Montreal Protocol aims to phase out 
ozone depleting substances (ODS): substances responsible for the thinning of the ozone 
layer in the stratosphere, which filters out ultraviolet radiation. The major ODS covered 
by the Protocol – so-called controlled substances – are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
Halons. Whilst developed countries faced binding emissions reductions from the start, 
developing countries were given a grace period over which they were allowed to 
increase their emissions. This period is now over and developing countries are also 
obliged to phase out ODS. Several amendments and additions have developed the 
Protocol further. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES)
CITES is one of the oldest MEAs. It is sometimes also known as the Washington 
Convention. Adopted in March 1973 and entered into force in 1975, it currently has 154 
parties as of January 2002. Its major goal is to monitor and regulate international trade 
in endangered species of wild fauna and flora and to ultimately stop all illegal trade in 
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such species. It practically bans all trade in about 900 species and severely regulates 
trade in about another 29000 species. 
 
The Basel Convention
The Basel Convention was adopted in 1989 and entered into force three years later. It 
has 149 parties as of January 2002. Prominent instances of transboundary movements of 
hazardous waste, particularly into developing countries had prompted negotiators to 
address questions regarding the management, disposal and transboundary movement of 
the 400 million or so tonnes of hazardous waste produced every year. Its major 
objectives are the reduction of hazardous waste production, an encouragement of 
treatment and disposal of such waste close to the sources of production and a 
minimisation of transboundary movements in hazardous waste. An amendment to the 
Convention practically prohibits all shipments of hazardous waste from developed to 
developing countries. 
7.1 The Montreal Protocol
Its trade provisions… 
The Montreal Protocol’s major trade provisions are contained in its Art. 4. It bans 
imports (Art. 4.1) and exports (Art. 4.2) of controlled substances between parties and 
non-parties of the Protocol, unless non-parties can demonstrate that in spite of not being 
formally a party to the Protocol they nevertheless comply with its obligations (Art. 4.8). 
Art. 4.3 also bans the import of products containing controlled substances from non-
parties. In principle, Art. 4.4 of the Protocol even provides the possibility to ban or 
restrict the import from non-parties of products made with, but not containing, 
42 
controlled substances. However, such restrictions were soon be deemed infeasible by 
the parties to the Protocol. These provisions were therefore never made operational and 
it must be regarded as highly unlikely that they would ever become operationalised.  
Its non-compliance problems… 
Four important non-compliance issues that the Montreal Protocol faces are (Brown 
Weiss 1998, p 152f.):  
• failure to report or to report fully on a timely basis; 
• failure to meet targets and timetables for controlled chemicals (in Russia and several 
central and east European countries); 
• smuggling of CFCs into Western countries; 
• anticipated compliance problems by several developing countries in meeting targets 
and timetables when their period of grace expires.  
The most important non-compliance problem is illegal trade in ODS. To contain this 
problem, the Montreal Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, which at the time of 
writing had been ratified by 37 nations and entered into force in November 1999, 
introduces a mandatory licensing system for the import and export of ODS from 2000 
onwards with developing countries enjoying the possibility to delay introduction of such 
a licensing system for methyl bromide and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) until 
2002 and 2005, respectively.  
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Its generous assistance provisions… 
In spite of all its trade provisions, the Montreal Protocol comes closest to the ideal 
model of the carrots approach as set out in section 5 of this report. Parties are required 
to submit regular reports, which are reviewed and consolidated by the Secretariat. In 
1990 an Implementation Committee was created for the Montreal Protocol that deals 
with compliance issues. It consists of ten Parties elected for a two-year period. It hears 
any complaint brought to it by any Party to the Protocol or the Secretariat. While it 
cannot take decisions, its role is to determine the facts and possible causes of non-
compliance and to make recommendations to the Meeting of Parties with respect to the 
measures for bringing the relevant Party back into compliance. These mechanisms 
include technical and financial assistance, the issuing of warnings as well as the 
suspension of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol (WTO and UNEP 2001).  
The financial and technical assistance provided through the Montreal Protocol has been 
hailed by the OECD (1997a, p. 15) as an ‘outstanding example of integrating financial 
and technical assistance into an international environmental protection regime’. After 
the Conference of Parties agreed to create a fund for developing countries to meet their 
“agreed incremental costs” in 1990 in London, the so-called Multilateral Fund became 
formally established in December 1992. Areas eligible for funded assistance include, 
inter alia, the preparation of developing country programmes to identify their special 
assistance needs, facilitation of technical cooperation, dissemination of information and 
training and the financing of investment projects. More than US$ 1.25 billion have been 
made available to finance the fund.8 In addition, the GEF has provided another US$ 160 
million. 
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In case of disputes between Parties, the Montreal Protocol requests Parties to seek 
solution by negotiation or mediation first before bringing the dispute to arbitration 
within the auspices of the Protocol or before the ICJ.  
At the 13th Meeting of the Parties in October 2001 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, compliance 
by developing countries with their ODS control obligations was reviewed.  With the 
help of generous financial and technical assistance, the vast majority of developing 
countries managed to comply with their obligations. Only about 20 countries are 
actually or potentially in non-compliance.  Those in actual non-compliance were 
explicitly named in the final decisions of the implementation committee. They were 
encouraged to get back into compliance for which they could existing assistance 
provisions, but also warned that further measures would be considered against them 
should they fail to return to compliance.  
7.2 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES)
 
Its trade provisions… 
CITES is not a MEA with trade amongst many other provisions. Rather, its very aim is 
to restrict international trade in endangered species. CITES’ major trade provisions are 
as follows: Appendix I contains species (around 600 animals and 300 plant species), 
which are threatened with extinction and whose trade for commercial purposes is 
generally prohibited with few exceptions (Art. III). Appendix II contains a further 4000 
animals and 25,000 plants species, which might become threatened with extinction if 
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their trade was not regulated. Their export is only allowed if the exporter has acquired 
an export permit from the state of export, testifying that the export will not be 
detrimental to the survival of that species, that the specimen were not obtained in 
contravention of protection laws of the exporting state and that any living specimen will 
be so prepared for transport that risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment is 
minimised (Art. IV). Similar to the Montreal Protocol, trade in appendix II and, in rare 
circumstances, even in appendix I species is possible with non-parties if these countries 
can demonstrate that they fully comply with the convention (Art. X). If a party fails to 
comply with the convention obligations it can lose its right to be treated as a party and 
can essentially be treated as a non-party.  
Experts’ assessments on the effectiveness of CITES are mixed (OECD 1999, p. 22). 
Crocodilians and elephants are the cases where CITES might have significantly helped 
to improve their conservation. It has been less effective with respect to, for example, 
rhino and tiger species and has been indifferent with respect to the conservation status 
of some other species (ibid). Martin (2000, p. 30) comes to the rather sobering 
conclusion that ‘if the convention is benefiting species then, even after careful study, it 
has not been demonstrated’. One shortcoming is that CITES is unbalanced in regarding 
international trade in wildlife all too often as a threat to preservation rather than as a 
means to raise the preservation value of endangered species if properly regulated. 
Complete trade bans often merely raise the value of illegal trafficking and render 
stringent controls more difficult.  
46 
Its reporting requirements… 
Parties to CITES are required to submit regular reports on their implementation of the 
convention. Both the Secretariat and the Animals and Plant Committee review and 
monitor compliance. A NGO network called TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analsyis of 
Flora and Fauna in Commerce) provides valuable information input. A Standing 
Committee, with Parties from each of the six geographic regions, deals with non-
compliance issues. Similar to the Montreal Protocol, this Standing Committee as well as 
the Secretariat only make recommendations and leave decisions to the Conference of 
Parties. In case of non-compliance a warning is issued. If the relevant Party fails to 
enact regulations that bring it into compliance a recommendation by the Conference of 
Parties to suspend trade in relevant species will be the consequence (WTO and UNEP 
2001).  
Its limited assistance provisions… 
Parties in compliance difficulties can obtain assistance from the Secretariat to help it 
achieve compliance. Furthermore, the Secretariat provides enforcement seminars, 
customs training packages and assists in the creation and translation of identification 
manuals (OECD 1997b). However and importantly, there is no such generous funding 
available as is the case with the Montreal Protocol.   
7.3 The Basel Convention
 
Similar to CITES, restrictions of trade are at the heart of the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. It aims 
to ‘ensure that the management of hazardous wastes and other wastes including their 
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transboundary movement and disposal is consistent with the protection of human health 
and the environment whatever the place of disposal’ (preamble).  
Its trade provisions… 
Its major trade provisions are as follows: Trade in hazardous waste is subjected to a 
comprehensive control system, which is based on the principle of prior informed 
consent (PIC). This means that a country can only export these materials to another 
country if it has gained the prior written consent from the importing country and all 
transit countries (Art. 6). Trade in these materials with non-parties is prohibited (Art. 
4:5) unless agreements with these non-parties have been concluded, which ‘do not 
derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and other 
wastes as required by this Convention’ (Art. 11:1). A party has the right to ban the entry 
or disposal of foreign hazardous waste in its territory (Art. 4:1). Furthermore, an 
amendment to the Convention generally bans trade in these materials between so-called 
Annex VII (OECD-countries) and non-Annex VII countries. However, at the time of 
writing, this amendment had only been ratified by 20 countries and it is unclear whether 
it will reach the necessary ratifications to enter into force (cf. Krueger 1999, pp. 106-
108).  
Its reporting requirements 
and limited assistance provisions… 
Parties to the Basel Convention are still working on the development of a procedure 
dealing with compliance issues. As with the other two MEAs looked at here, Parties are 
required to submit an annual report to the Secretariat. Parties may also notify the 
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Secretariat if they suspect any other Party of non-compliance with or non-enforcement 
of the rules of the Convention. The Secretariat maintains an international reporting 
system for cases of illegal trade in hazardous waste. It is also supposed to provide 
advice and assistance to the Parties. However, similar to CITES and contrary to the 
Montreal Protocol, there is no generous funding for assisting developing countries in 
their efforts to comply with the Convention. An UNCTAD (1997, p. 5) paper notes the 
‘potential huge gap between resource requirements and their availability’ for the 
creation of centres on training and technology transfer.  
7.4 Carrots or sticks: which approach has been more effective?
 
The natural question is whether the carrots or the sticks approach has been more 
effective with respect to the three MEAs looked at here. Certainly, as concerns 
deterrence of external free-riding, trade measures have played an important role. Even 
then, however, carrots have also been important. For example, with respect to the 
Montreal Protocol, it is next to impossible to separate the effects of the threat of trade 
measures (sticks) from the effects that the promise of financial assistance for developing 
countries (carrots) contained in Art. 10 of the Protocol had on encouraging participation 
from the developing world.  
Generous assistance has been 
decisive for the success of the Montreal Protocol… 
As concerns compliance itself, however, there can be little doubt that the generous 
assistance provided by the Protocol has helped enormously in keeping non-compliance 
at a minimum. The financial funds made available for developing countries through the 
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Multilateral Fund are commonly hailed as the prime example of an effective and 
successful application of the carrots approach. Many countries, such as Cameroon and 
China received financial assistance to develop a national strategy for the phasing out of 
ozone-depleting substances as required by the Protocol (Jacobson and Brown Weiss 
1998, p. 526).  
As one observer has noted with respect to the importance of the carrots approach for the 
success of the Montreal Protocol: ‘There was a strong feeling that if Parties felt they 
were being subjected to some kind of judicial process they would become defensive and 
turn in on themselves, with the result the ozone layer would be the loser. With a more 
constructive approach based on a recognition that non-compliance is frequently the 
consequence (…) of technical, administrative or economic problems, a regime that 
worked with, rather than against Parties in difficulty was sought’ (Patrick Szell, cited in 
OECD 1997a, p. 27).  
Some of the problems of CITES can be traced 
back to its lack of generous assistance provisions… 
Unlike the Montreal Protocol, CITES does not contain substantial financial assistance to 
help developing countries comply with the convention, which has been regarded as one 
of the major reasons for poor implementation of species trade control systems in these 
countries and consequently substantial illegal poaching and trafficking (OECD 1999, 
p26). This failure to address the ‘lack of institutional capacity in many developing 
countries to administer a complex agreement’ (OECD 1997b, p. 39) is the more 
lamentable given that ‘the striking contrast between the limited number of facilities that 
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produced ozone-depleting substances and the millions of individuals who could engage 
in illicit trade in endangered species helps to explain why CITES was much more 
difficult to enforce than the Montreal Protocol’ and would have warranted a much 
stronger carrots approach (Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998, p. 521).  
The same is true for the Basel Convention… 
Similar to CITES, the Basel Convention does not contain any substantial provisions for 
financial assistance to developing countries to assist them in implementing their 
obligations. This has been regarded as one of the major reasons for poor implementation 
of hazardous waste trade control systems in these countries and consequently substantial 
illegal trading, which will become exacerbated once the amendment to the Convention 
banning trade between OECD- and non-OECD-countries comes into force (OECD 




This report has argued that problems with compliance and enforcement in developing 
countries are likely to stem from insufficient capacity rather than wilful violations of 
MEA rules. As a consequence, the carrots approach is much more appropriate to deal 
with compliance and enforcement problems in MEAs than the sticks approach. To the 
least, it can be said that strong provisions for assistance in capacity building should 
accompany any trade measures in MEAs. Trade measures have gained immense 
prominence in theoretical analyses of how to prevent non-compliance and non-
enforcement, but the reality of MEAs is not captured in these models that do not and 
cannot adequately model the capacity problems in developing countries that are the real 
cause for non-compliance and non-enforcement.  
Whilst almost all MEAs have provisions for some assistance in capacity building and 
surprisingly few MEAs contain trade measures, the level of assistance is often minimal. 
CITES and the Basel Convention are good examples of MEAs for which the everything 
but generous level of assistance contributes significantly to problems with compliance 
and enforcement. The Montreal Protocol, on the other hand, provides for rather 
generous assistance, comes closest to the ideal model of the carrots approach set out in 
this report and not surprisingly is widely held as the prime example of an ambitious and 
yet  successful MEA.  
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The main lesson to be learnt from this report is that if tackling problems with 
compliance and enforcement are taken seriously, then developed countries must be 
willing to step up significantly the assistance for administrative, financial and technical 
capacity building in developing countries for achieving the goals of the MEA under 
negotiation. Developing countries should insist on provisions similar to the ones 
contained in the Montreal Protocol in negotiating new agreements and should try to 
convince their developed country counterparts that assistance in existing MEAs needs to 
be extended.  
Whilst this recommendation is perhaps politically not very realistic given the very 
limited willingness of developed countries to provide generous assistance, there will 
often be no other way if one is serious about tackling non-compliance and non-
enforcement. Developing country representatives are frustrated about the fact that whilst 
developing countries were willing to sign up to many MEAs that address environmental 
concerns in developed countries after the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the 
developed countries never really provided their part of the bargain and did not step up 
assistance as hoped for by developing countries. Non-compliance with MEA rules in 
developing countries can therefore be understood to some extent as a consequence of 
the non-compliance of developed countries with their commitment to provide adequate 
assistance to developing countries. Given this context, it would not only, as argued 
above, be highly ineffective to apply the sticks approach rather than the carrots 
approach, but it would also be highly unfair to developing countries and their 
development needs.  
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9. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following policy recommendations follow from the report:  
• The sticks approach employing trade measures is not suitable for tackling non-
compliance and non-enforcement in MEAs. It does not address the root causes of 
non-compliance and non-enforcement.  
• Increased use of trade measures could also clash with WTO rules.  
• At the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, WTO members have 
decided to initiate negotiations concerning the compatibility of trade measures 
contained in MEAs and WTO rules. WTO members should take into account the 
unsuitability of trade measures for tackling non-compliance and non-enforcement in 
MEAs in their negotiations.  
• Generous assistance provisions (the carrots approach) address the root cause of non-
compliance and non-enforcement, which is limited financial and managerial 
capacity.  
• The Montreal Protocol is the most successful MEA so far precisely because of its 
generous assistance provisions.  
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• If policy makers and treaty negotiators want to seriously tackle non-compliance and 
non-enforcement, then they have to give generous assistance provisions a much 
more prominent role in MEAs.  
• Compliance and enforcement of MEA obligations by developing countries is only 
possible if developed countries comply with their obligations to provide assistance.   
• Compliance and enforcement do not come cheaply, but without generous assistance 
the call for greater compliance and enforcement is merely cheap talk.  
• Developing country negotiators should insist in amendments to existing MEAs or in 
negotiations for new MEAs that generous assistance provisions are considered an 




1 The term “developing countries” refers here to all countries other than the 15 
European Union member countries, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Japan and the US. 
2 Note, however, that developed countries might have less problems with compliance 
and enforcement because MEA rules might be set in a way that conforms with 
existing practice in those countries or requires things that developed countries would 
have wanted to undertake in any case. In other words, given that developed countries 
are often leading in environmental affairs the rules laid down in MEAs might require 
only little, if any, change from developed countries in order to achieve compliance. It 
might therefore not come as great surprise that they will find it much easier to 
comply. 
3 Even in the case where non-compliance and non-enforcement is caused by a lack of 
will one needs to be careful in condemning the country. Non-compliance or non-
enforcement due to lack of will is objectionable if the country is truly free-riding on 
other countries’ efforts. This would be the case if the country is better off with the 
MEA, but is even better off if all other countries comply, but the country itself does 
not and free-rides on other countries’ efforts. If, however, the MEA is unbalanced in 
the sense that a country does worse with the MEA than it does without it then wilful 
non-compliance might be more difficult to condemn. After all, most would agree that 
a MEA should represent a Pareto improvement, i.e. should make all countries better 
off without making any one worse off. If this is not the case, then non-compliance or 
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non-enforcement might be a way for a country to avoid being worse off if it had been 
bullied into an unbalanced MEA or has signed up to it without realising that it will be 
worse off. 
4 The major contributions are have been made by Steve Charnovitz, Scott Barrett, 
Carlo Carraro, Domenico Siniscalco, Alfred Endres, Michael Finus and Bianca 
Rundshagen (see Neumayer 2001a). 
5 A necessary condition is, however, that the trade measures are executed by a certain 
minimum number of countries and not just by one country alone (Barrett 1997, p. 
347). Indeed, cooperating countries that fail to execute trade measures against free-
riders might themselves face trade measures. 
6 An existing example of the latter is the Ozone Action Clearing House. 
7 At the time of writing, the ICJ never had to deal with a truly environmental 
international dispute. 
8 The 13th Meeting of the Parties decided to evaluate and review the performance of 
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